Traffic deaths and fuel use – overwhelming influence is public policy, not vehicle characteristics

Leonard Evans

American Journal of Public Health. 97 (no. 4), p. 588  (April 2007)

(letter to the editor in response to article Blood and oil: vehicle characteristics in relation to fatality risk and fuel economy by Leon S. Robertson)

The purpose of this letter is not to dispute or endorse Robertson’s[1] detailed findings, but to question their relevance.  As documented in my book Traffic Safety[2], vehicle characteristics are not central to either safety or fuel use.

The relative unimportance of vehicles to safety is revealed by comparing fatality time trends in different countries.^{2 ,p.381-8}  From 1979 through 2002, Britain, Canada, and Australia reduced fatalities by an average of 49%, compared to 16% in the US.  If US deaths had dropped by 49%, more than16,000 fewer Americans would have died in 2002.  Accumulating the differences over 1979 – 2002 shows that by merely matching the mediocre safety performance of these countries, about 200,000 fewer Americans would have died.

These trends continue.  In 2005 the US recorded 43,443 traffic deaths, the highest total in 15 years.[3]  Sweden recorded 440[4] – their lowest total since the 1940s.  Among US states with smaller populations than Sweden, 23 recorded more deaths than Sweden, 11 more than twice as many, and one (NC with 1,534) more than three times as many.

The obsessive focus of US policy on vehicles rather than on effective countermeasures is at the core of our dramatic safety failure.[5]^{, 2 ,p.389-407}  It is driver behavior,[6] and government policies addressing driver behavior (belt-wearing, drunk driving, running red lights, speeding, etc.) that substantially affect casualties.^{2 ,p.332-58}

In commercial aviation safety, the US leads the world.  In 2002 there were zero fatalities.[7]  Yet (for operational reasons) modern aircraft are far less crashworthy than those in earlier high-fatality years.  Aviation safety succeeds by focusing on preventing crashes, not surviving them.  Road safety should adopt this focus.[8]

The introduction of CAFE was followed by increases in (1) total fuel used (2) the percent imported, and (3) annual mileage per vehicle.^{2 ,p.89-91}  Total fuel use is determined by economics, not details of how it is consumed.  Expecting CAFE to reduce fuel use is about as sensible as expecting to cure an alcoholic by insisting he drink out of a smaller glass.

The most effective policy is to increase fuel taxes. This is politically unacceptable, but we feel we must do something, no matter how irrelevant.  As a nation we are like a 300 pound patient asking a doctor to reduce our weight – but with the stipulation that the treatment must not mention diet or exercise.

For both safety and fuel, it is government policies, not vehicle characteristics, that are crucial.

References

See also Swedish versus USA Traffic Safety: What Comparing Fatalities Tells Us